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ADVOCATING FOR THE ADOPTION OF 
WEST VIRGINIA’S SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN 
STANDARD ACROSS THE MINING STATES 
KATHRYN SCHERPF* 
Abstract: Horizontal severance deeds separate property above and below the 
surface of land. In such deeds, typically the property rights below belong to 
mineral owners while property rights above belong to farmers. In most states, 
common law trespass utilizes what is generally known as the reasonable neces-
sity doctrine to account for the rights that each owner has to enjoy in connection 
with his respective property. This doctrine has evolved over time and establishes 
the degree of surface damage that mineral owners can cause in accessing miner-
als below without becoming liable to the surface owner for damages. Recently, 
West Virginia made its standard more rigorous by prohibiting mineral owners 
from substantially burdening the surface estate. If other mining states like Texas 
and Pennsylvania were to incorporate West Virginia’s heightened standard into 
their respective doctrines, then the farming industry may receive greater nation-
al protection. And, since farming is currently thriving, heightened protection 
may even lead to greater national economic growth. 
INTRODUCTION 
In mining country, property is often split in horizontal severance deeds, 
whereby two separate estates are created: an estate in the surface of the 
property and a separate estate in the mineral rights underground.1 Disputes 
typically arise when mining and drilling companies damage the surface land 
while accessing the minerals below.2 Although different states apply differ-
ent standards in determining the rights of mineral owners, often, states will 
ultimately recognize some right to destroy surface land.3 
                                                                                                                           
 * Senior Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2015–
2016. 
 1 Christopher Kulander, Big Money vs. Grand Designs: Revisiting the Executive Right to 
Lease Oil & Gas Interests, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 33, 33–34 (2009). 
 2 See BLAKELY E. WHILDEN, MINERAL RIGHTS IN CENTRAL APPALACHIA: A BRIEF HISTORY 
OF THE BROAD FORM DEED IN KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE 2 (n.d.), http://studentorgs.law.unc.
edu/documents/elp/2012/whilden_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/H3WL-NHYQ]. 
 3 See, e.g., Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 729 F.3d 381, 394 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(condoning mineral owner’s drilling activities); Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 
252 (Tex. 2013) (holding in favor of a mineral owner that surface destruction was reasonable); Pa. 
Game Comm’n v. Seneca Res. Corp., 84 A.3d 1098, 1106 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (determining 
that subsurfurace fracking activities destroying the surface were acceptable). 
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In Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., the Supreme Court of Texas granted 
such destruction right to the mineral owner, albeit to the detriment of the 
surface owner.4 In Limestone County, Texas, plaintiff Homer Merriman 
filed an injunction against defendant XTO Energy, Inc. (“XTO”), a mining 
company.5 Merriman, a cattle herder, had purchased forty acres of surface 
land on which to live and run a cattle ranching operation.6 On the same plot 
of land, XTO possessed rights to the minerals located below the surface.7 In 
accessing the minerals, XTO devastated Merriman’s property by destroying 
the cattle business that he spent over a decade building.8 XTO drilled a well 
on the same forty-acre tract of land on which Merriman configured perma-
nent corrals and catch-pens for his cattle operation.9 After failed attempts to 
re-configure his corrals and catch-pens, Merriman was out of options.10 In-
deed, he could not just simply lease land somewhere else to run his busi-
ness.11 It was crucial for Merriman to have the base of the cattle operation 
literally in his backyard so that he could conduct the cattle roundup in the 
evenings.12 He did not hire anyone else to help him run this undertaking, 
and he worked another job that required him to be gone for long hours, six 
days a week.13 Although Merriman did lease other land for his cattle to 
graze, it would have been a significant investment of capital and time to 
relocate the roundup; further, the roundup operation required a permanent 
fence, which Merriman was very hesitant to build on leased property.14 
Despite the fact that XTO’s actions devastated the surface so as to end 
Merriman’s cattle business, the Supreme Court of Texas found that this 
damage was acceptable and that Merriman failed to demonstrate that there 
were no reasonable alternative means for him to maintain his use of the sur-
                                                                                                                           
 4 407 S.W.3d at 252. 
 5 Id. at 246. 
 6 Id. at 247. Merriman’s home and barn were on the same forty-acre tract of land where he in-
stalled a permanent fence and corrals to use in a cattle operation. Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, Merriman, 407 S.W.3d 244 (No. 11-0494), 2012 WL 
6044205, at *5. 
 9 Id. at *32–33. 
 10 See id. (“I have attempted to devise a way to re-configure my corrals and catch-pens so as 
to conduct my cattle operation on my property with the well present. My efforts were unsuccess-
ful.”). 
 11 See id. at *5–6. Because Merriman’s operation required a permanent fence, he was only 
comfortable building the corral operation on the land he owned. Id. Further, Merriman worked 
another job elsewhere and thus was limited to conducting his operation at certain times. Id. As a 
result, it was not feasible for Merriman to look into leasing another tract of land to set up his oper-
ation. See id. at *6. 
 12 Id. at *5–6. 
 13 See id. at *6. Homer Merriman worked as a pharmacist during the day. Merriman v. XTO 
Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. 2013). 
 14 Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 8, at *5. 
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face property.15 If this case was decided by a court in West Virginia apply-
ing the substantial burden test, it is likely that Merriman would have pre-
vailed because such a substantial burden to Merriman was a violation of his 
property rights, even if such damage was reasonably necessary for XTO to 
access the minerals below.16 
In Part I, this Note compares how different mining states balance the 
property rights of surface estate and mineral owners.17 Part II then argues 
that West Virginia’s reasonable necessity doctrine is superior to that of 
states with similar mining and drilling operations, particularly Texas and 
Pennsylvania.18 This is because unlike the other states, West Virginia incor-
porates a substantial burden requirement whereby the mineral owner can do 
what is reasonably necessary to access minerals below but cannot substan-
tially burden the surface land without an explicit deed provision granting 
permission to do so.19 
This heightened standard offers greater potential for surface owner pro-
tection than the standards currently applied in other similarly situated states.20 
Further, if other states incorporate the heightened standard into their respec-
tive doctrines, the national economy could benefit, as well.21 A mine typically 
produces its highest returns in the first few years of operation but then pro-
duction gradually drops to zero over time.22 In contrast, a farm produces a 
stable output indefinitely into the future.23 By prohibiting substantial (and at 
times, irreparable) harm to the surface—even if reasonably necessary to ac-
cess minerals below—West Virginia’s demonstrates a heightened concern for 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 252. Merriman argued that he was essentially forced to end 
his operation because he did not own other lands to build a permanent fence and was not comfort-
able doing so on lands he leased. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 8, at *27. 
 16 See Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721, 725–26 (W. Va. 1980) (holding that the 
mineral owner’s surface activities must not only be reasonably necessary to access minerals below 
but must also be exercised without substantially burdening the surface owner). 
 17 See infra notes 26–141 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 142–250 and accompanying text. 
 19 See Buffalo Mining Co., 267 S.E.2d at 725–26. 
 20 Compare id. (incorporating the requirement that mineral owners not burden surface land 
even if reasonable necessary to access minerals below, if such action will substantially burden the 
surface estate and the deed provision does not explicitly grant the mineral owner the right to cause 
such harm), with Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 252 (applying a less rigorous version of the reasonable 
necessity doctrine such that mineral owners may harm surface land as much as reasonably necessary 
even if the harm is substantial). 
 21 See infra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. Compare Buffalo Mining Co., 267 S.E.2d at 
725–26 (establishing high substantial burden standard protecting farmers from surface harm), with 
Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 252 (requiring a less burdensome standard). 
 22 William J. Bernstein, Of Mines, Forests, and Impatience, EFFICIENT FRONTIER (2001), 
http://www.efficientfrontier.com/ef/401/fisher.htm [http://perma.cc/A957-UPL4]. 
 23 See id. 
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each industry’s value to our national economy.24 As such, West Virginia’s 
doctrine provides a more conducive environment for farming.25 
I. COMPARISON OF COMMON LAW DOCTRINES REGARDING PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AND HORIZONTAL SEVERANCE DEEDS  
When activities of the mineral estate owner amount to common law 
trespass, surface owners are entitled to injunctive relief.26 Common law 
trespass typically occurs when a mineral owner’s activities exceed the scope 
of what is granted—either implicitly or explicitly—in the severance deed.27 
When property rights are granted through a horizontal severance deed, min-
eral owners are normally authorized implicitly to conduct operations along 
the surface as reasonably necessary to obtain the minerals below.28 There 
are doctrinal differences amongst states with heavy mining and drilling op-
erations in terms of how much of a surface burden mineral owners are enti-
tled to create in the obtainment of minerals and enjoyment of property 
rights below.29 
Like other similarly situated states, West Virginia common law grants 
the mineral estate owner the use of the surface land as long as such usage is 
reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the minerals below.30 Unlike 
many other states with heavy mining and drilling operations, however, West 
Virginia also requires that the mineral owner’s use of the surface land not 
substantially burden the surface property.31 This Note calls for other states 
with heavy mining operations to incorporate the substantial burden re-
quirement from West Virginia into their own common law doctrines that 
currently employ a reasonable necessity standard.32 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See Buffalo Mining Co., 267 S.E.2d at 725–26 (holding that the mineral owner’s surface 
activities must not only be reasonably necessary to access minerals below but must also be exercised 
without substantially burdening the surface owner). 
 25 See id. 
 26 Rachel Heron et al., Commentary, The Interpretation of Surface Easements in Severance 
Deeds as a Limit on Hydraulic Fracturing Practices, 19 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 73, 74–75 (2011–2012). 
 27 See id. 
 28 See Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 729 F.3d 381, 390 (4th Cir. 2013) (de-
scribing how horizontal severance deeds grant rights to mineral owners below and rights to sur-
face owners above the surface). 
 29 Compare id. (applying standard which prohibits mining operators from substantially bur-
dening surface land), with Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Tex. 2013) (illus-
trating how Texas does not require the stringent standard used by other courts), and Pa. Game 
Comm’n v. Seneca Res. Corp., 84 A.3d 1098, 1106 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (making no mention 
of any limitations on the substantiality of the surface burden that an owner should be expected to 
tolerate from activity by a subsurface mineral right owner). 
 30 See Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721, 725 (W. Va. 1980). 
 31 See id. at 725–26. 
 32 See infra notes 178–250 and accompanying text. 
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Other states, like Texas and Pennsylvania, also consider the surface 
owner’s use of the land as a factor in determining parties’ rights.33 Yet they do 
not display a concern for surface owners that is equivalent to West Virginia’s 
substantial burden requirement.34 For instance, in Texas, Homer Merriman, a 
surface owner, built a permanent fence with a corral on his tract of land for 
use in his cattle operation.35 That court held that despite the surface owner’s 
substantial hardship, he was not entitled to an injunction to prevent the min-
eral owner’s damaging well operation.36 If this case had been heard in West 
Virginia as opposed to Texas, the outcome may have been more favorable for 
the surface owner because West Virginia courts recognize substantial harm to 
the surface as sufficient grounds to grant an injunction.37 
A. The Reasonable Necessity Doctrine 
Trespass is “entry on another man’s ground without lawful authority, 
and doing some damage, however inconsiderable, to his real property.”38 
Continuing trespass occurs if one leaves on the land of another, with a duty 
to remove it, any “structure, chattel, or other thing.”39 The law of trespass 
applies when one enters the land of another—or as relevant to the case here, 
leaves something upon the land of another—without “lawful authority” to 
do so.40 
A license is a typical method of obtaining lawful authority to enter or 
leave something on another’s land.41 With a license, a licensee is permitted, 
upon agreement with the licensor, to commit some act upon the land of the 
licensor that would otherwise be unlawful.42 Over the years, however, vari-
ous states’ common law trespass doctrines established a precedent that 
granted a mineral estate owner authority to enter upon the land of a surface 
estate owner—without express authority, license, or otherwise—to extract 
                                                                                                                           
 33 See Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 249; Seneca Res. Corp., 84 A.3d at 1106 (allowing the miner-
al owner to use so much of the surface as is reasonably necessary). 
 34 Compare Seneca Res. Corp., 84 A.3d at 1106 (requiring a less burdensome standard), and 
Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 249 (mentioning no requirement as to the degree to surface harm permit-
ted), with Buffalo Mining Co., 267 S.E.2d at 725–26 (establishing a heightened standard prohibiting 
mineral owners from substantially burdening surface estates). 
 35 Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 247. 
 36 Id. at 251–52. 
 37 Compare Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 249 (requiring a less burdensome standard whereby sub-
stantial surface harm is permitted), with Buffalo Mining Co., 267 S.E.2d at 725–26 (establishing a 
heightened standard protecting farmers from substantial surface harm). 
 38 Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 729 F.3d 381, 386 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing 
Hark v. Mountain Fork Lumber Co., 34 S.E.2d 348, 352 (W. Va. 1945)). 
 39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 160 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 40 Whiteman, 729 F.3d at 386 (internal citation omitted). 
 41 Id. at 387. 
 42 License, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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minerals when reasonably necessary to do so.43 This concept of reasonable 
necessity established the notion that a mineral estate owner enters the sur-
face estate owner’s land without lawful authority “only if doing so ‘ex-
ceed[s] [the mineral estate owner’s] rights . . . thereby invading the rights’ 
of the surface estate owner.”44 
In 1874 in Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining Co., the New York Court of 
Appeals initially established the reasonable necessity doctrine. 45 There, a 
surface owner sought to uphold an injunction granted against a mineral 
owner from mining below and leaving “ore and rubbish” on the surface.46 
The surface estate owner had claimed that the mineral estate owner deposit-
ed “ore and rubbish” from the mines along the surface.47 The lower court 
found that while the mineral estate owner had a right to enter the surface 
estate owner’s land to mine, no right existed “to deposit or keep upon [the 
surface estate owner’s] lands any . . . refuse stuff or rubbish.”48 That court 
then ordered the mineral estate owner to remove the “ore and rubbish” de-
posited on the surface and enjoined the mineral estate owner from future 
waste disposal on such land.49 
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, because the 
lower court did not consider if it was “necessary [to deposit mine waste] for 
the reasonably profitable enjoyment” of the mineral estate owner’s property 
in the minerals.50 The court explained that a grant of minerals beneath a 
tract of land carries with it a right to use the surface as fairly necessary to 
recover the mineral holder’s “reasonably profitable enjoyment” of the min-
eral.51 This has come to be called the reasonable necessity standard.52 The 
Marvin court further explained that it is rarely acceptable to leave such 
waste on the land, but that necessary is a fluid concept: “The facts of each 
case” must determine what is necessary.53 
                                                                                                                           
 43 Whiteman, 729 F.3d at 387 (citing Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining Co., 55 N.Y. 538, 538 
(1874)); Friedline v. Hoffman, 115 A. 845, 846 (Pa. 1922) (citing to Marvin, 55 N.Y. at 538). 
 44 Whiteman, 729 F.3d at 387 (quoting Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., 61 S.E.2d 633, 635 (W. 
Va. 1950)) (emphasis added). 
 45 55 N.Y. at 565. 
 46 Id. at 543. 
 47 Id. at 540–41. 
 48 Id. at 543. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 565. 
 51 Id. 
 52 See Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 729 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2013) (ex-
plaining that Marvin was the seminal case that introduced “the concept of what has come to be 
known as reasonable necessity and its application to severance deed construction”). 
 53 Marvin, 55 N.Y. at 553. 
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After the Marvin decision, the reasonable necessity standard was in-
corporated into various states’ common law trespass doctrines.54 Thereafter, 
the Marvin decision was seen as officially laying out the principle that min-
eral estate ownership implies a “right to use the surface in such manner and 
with such means as fairly necessary for the enjoyment” of the mineral es-
tate.55 Porter v. Mack Manufacturing Co. and Squires v. Lafferty were semi-
nal West Virginia cases that, although not trespass cases, embodied the rea-
sonable necessity standard’s adoption and evolution.56 
In Porter, the mineral estate owner sought to mine minerals and carry 
them off using a tram road that he intended to build on the surface estate 
owner’s property.57 When the surface estate owner blocked the operation, 
the mineral estate owner sought an injunction against causing such obstruc-
tion to the mining operation.58 Similarly, in Squires, the mineral estate own-
er sought to drill test holes and transport machinery and men over the sur-
face estate owner’s property, but the surface owner locked the access gate to 
the land and even assaulted the mineral estate owner’s employees for forc-
ing passage.59 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia ruled alike in both 
cases, holding that the building of a tram road across the surface estate 
owner’s property, drilling of test holes, and transport of machinery and men 
across the surface were activities “fairly necessary” to the enjoyment of the 
mineral estate.60 Thus, although both Porter and Squires were not actions 
grounded in trespass, the resulting standard is still the same: A mineral es-
                                                                                                                           
 54 See, e.g., Whiteman, 729 F.3d at 388 (following Marvin, a line of precedent was established 
in West Virginia informing a mineral estate owner’s authority to enter upon the land of a surface 
estate owner without express license or otherwise); Buck Creek R.R. Co. v. Haws, 69 S.W.2d 333, 
336 (Ky. 1934) (availability of damages for trespass “outside the reasonably necessary right of 
way”); Meixner v. Buecksler, 13 N.W.2d 754, 756 (Minn. 1944) (saying that the “general rule to 
do a particular act carries with it authority and the right by implication to do all that is necessary to 
effect the principal object and to avail the licensee of his rights under license”); Jones v. Erie & 
Wyo. Valley R.R. Co., 32 A. 535, 537 (Pa. 1895) (that powers are given “in plains words, or by 
necessary implication”); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Tex. 1967) 
(“[R]ight to use as much of the premises . . . as was reasonably necessary to comply with the terms 
of the lease and to effectuate its purposes.”). 
 55 Whiteman, 729 F.3d at 388 (citing Porter v. Mack Mfg. Co., 64 S.E. 853, 854 (W. Va. 1909)); 
see also Squires v. Lafferty, 121 S.E. 90, 91 (W. Va. 1924) (concluding that the right to use the sur-
face “in a manner and with such means as would be fairly necessary” to enjoy the mineral estate is 
incident to mineral estate ownership). The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals uses the two 
phrases—“fairly necessary” and “reasonably necessary”—interchangeably. Whiteman, 729 F.3d at 
388 n.11. 
 56 See Squires, 121 S.E. at 91; Porter, 64 S.E. at 854. 
 57 64 S.E. at 853. 
 58 Id. 
 59 121 S.E. at 90. 
 60 See id. at 91; Porter, 64 S.E. at 854. 
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tate owner has the right to use the surface “in such a manner and with such 
means as would be fairly necessary” to enjoy the mineral estate.61 
In the wake of Porter and Squires, the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
West Virginia held in Adkins v. United Fuel Gas that a mineral owner’s 
drilling operations were not unreasonable or unnecessary.62 In Adkins, a sur-
face owner brought a trespass claim against a mineral owner for drilling a 
gas well near the center of the surface owner’s fifty-acre tract on which he 
grew alfalfa, corn, and vegetables.63 Further, the mineral estate owner con-
structed, through the area used to grow crops, a road and pipelines to access 
the well and two ditches.64 One ditch was designed to carry water and re-
fuse from the gas well, and the other was created to lay a gas pipe necessary 
to operate the gas well.65 The surface estate owner was unable to produce 
crops as a result of the mineral estate owner’s activities.66 Once the drilling 
operation finished, the Adkins mineral estate owner removed one of the gas 
pipes, drained the ditches, and covered them, but left a permanent gas pipe 
underground.67 
Here, the Adkins court applied the reasonable necessity standard as 
laid out in Porter and Squires and held that none of defendant’s activities 
were unnecessary or unreasonable.68 Defendant needed to construct the road 
to bring in machinery to drill the well; similarly, installing the pipeline 
along the surface was not found to be unnecessary.69 The court reasoned 
that defendant’s construction of the open ditch for draining sand, water, and 
other refuse from drilling operations appeared to be an effort by the defend-
ant to keep the refuse from spreading to the plaintiff’s neighboring surface 
land, and, therefore, was an attempt by the defendant to minimize surface 
harm.70 
While many states utilize the reasonable necessity standard in horizon-
tal severance deed issues, each state applies the standard differently.71 West 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 729 F.3d 381, 388 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 62 Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., 61 S.E.2d 633, 636 (W. Va. 1950). 
 63 Id. at 634. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. Considerable amounts of water, oil, and refuse were deposited on plaintiff’s garden that 
was located close to defendant’s well. Id. Plaintiff showed further that roughly three-tenths of an 
acre of the alfalfa was destroyed, another seven-tenths of an acre could not be cut and so was 
useless to plaintiff, and finally, that the corn field was not plowable because of defendant’s activi-
ties on the surface. Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 See id. at 636. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Compare Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721, 725–26 (W. Va. 1980) (establish-
ing West Virginia’s heightened standard protecting surface owners from substantial harm), with 
Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Tex. 2013) (demonstrating Texas’ present 
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Virginia courts traditionally applied the reasonable necessity doctrine in 
line with the Marvin holding; but then, thirty-five years ago, the state’s 
highest court added a gloss to the doctrine and in turn heightened the standard 
whereby mineral owners could not be found liable for trespass.72 States with 
heavy drilling operations such as Texas and Pennsylvania should adopt West 
Virginia’s heightened standard into their respective common law doctrines 
to better protect surface owners.73 
B. West Virginia Strengthens the Reasonable Necessity Doctrine 
Following Adkins, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in 
Buffalo Mining scrutinized the doctrine of reasonable necessity.74 There, as 
in Porter and Squires, a mineral estate owner sought to enjoin the surface 
owner from obstructing mining operations.75 The surface owner primarily 
interfered with Buffalo Mining attempt to build a powerline needed to ven-
tilate a coal mine positioned below the surface estate.76 The Buffalo Mining 
court, however, rather than simply applying the previously laid out reason-
able necessity standard, applied the following gloss: 
[W]here implied as opposed to express rights are sought, the test of 
what is reasonable and necessary becomes more exacting, since the 
mineral estate owner is seeking a right that he claims not by virtue 
of any express language in the mineral severance deed, but by nec-
essary implication as a correlative to those rights expressed in the 
deed. In order for such a claim to be successful, it must be demon-
strated not only that the right is reasonably necessary for the ex-
traction of the mineral, but also that the right can be exercised 
without any substantial burden to the surface owner.77 
Accordingly, following Buffalo Mining the reasonable necessity doctrine 
became a two-prong test in West Virginia: (1) the proposed activity must be 
reasonably necessary; and (2) it must not cause a substantial burden to the 
surface owner.78 
                                                                                                                           
reasonable necessity doctrine that does not protect surface owners from substantial harm), and Pa. 
Game Comm’n v. Seneca Res. Corp., 84 A.3d 1098, 1106 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (demonstrating 
Pennsylvania’s reasonable necessity doctrine that permits substantial surface harm). 
 72 Buffalo Mining Co., 267 S.E.2d at 725–26. 
 73 See infra notes 74–250 and accompanying text. 
 74 See Buffalo Mining Co., 267 S.E.2d at 725–26. 
 75 Id. at 722. 
 76 See id. 
 77 Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 729 F.3d 381, 390 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Buffalo Mining Co., 267 S.E.2d at 725–26). 
 78 See Buffalo Mining Co., 267 S.E.2d at 725–26; see also Whiteman, 729 F.3d at 390 (ex-
plaining that the court in Buffalo Mining did not simply apply the “fairly necessary” doctrine as 
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The Buffalo Mining holding made the state’s reasonable necessity doc-
trine uniform in its application to two differing activities: (1) “[W]here the 
mineral estate owner engages in activity that disturbs, perhaps permanently 
and negatively, the surface”; and (2) “where the mineral estate owner en-
gages in activity that ‘virtually destroy[s]’ the surface or is otherwise ‘total-
ly incompatible with the rights of the surface owner.’”79 Buffalo Mining es-
sentially permits the first type of activity because such surface use is rea-
sonably necessary to access the minerals below and the surface does not 
tend to incur a substantial burden.80 Yet Buffalo Mining does not permit the 
second activity type to be implicit in a mineral estate, because damage to 
the surface tends to be substantial.81 Accordingly, if surface damage is sub-
stantial, a mineral estate owner will typically need an explicit deed provi-
sion before causing such destruction.82 
A recently decided trespass case further entrenched the Buffalo Mining 
holding into West Virginia common law.83 In Whiteman v. Chesapeake Ap-
palachia, L.L.C., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
upheld the finding of the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of West Virginia (applying West Virginia law) that the plaintiff-surface 
owners failed to present sufficient evidence to show that defendant-mining 
corporation’s drill waste pits imposed a substantial burden on the surface.84 
The only support that the surface owners produced to support an argument 
for a substantial burden to the land was their subjective fear that they would 
one day be held liable if another was injured on their property.85 Additional-
ly, the surface owners acknowledged that they experienced minimal pecuni-
ary loss due to the drill waste pits and that potential damage to the land was 
limited to ten acres.86 
Moreover, the Whiteman court upheld the earlier finding that the sur-
face owners failed to show that the pits were not reasonably necessary, as 
                                                                                                                           
laid out in Porter, Squires, Adkins, and others; instead, the Buffalo Mining court incorporated the 
substantial burden gloss to that doctrine). 
 79 Whiteman, 729 F.3d at 390 (quoting Buffalo Mining Co., 267 S.E.2d at 725–26). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 See id. at 382, 394. 
 84 Id. at 384, 392. The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s holding. Whiteman v. Chesa-
peake Appalachia, LLC, 873 F. Supp. 2d 767, 777 (N.D.W. Va. 2012) aff’d sub nom. Whiteman v. 
Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 729 F.3d 381 (4th Cir. 2013). This case was removed to federal 
court due to diversity jurisdiction: The Whitemans are domiciled in West Virginia, the state of the 
family’s residency, while Chesapeake is incorporated in and holds its primary place of business in 
Oklahoma. Id. at 384; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012). 
 85 See Whiteman, 729 F.3d at 384, 392. 
 86 Id. at 383, 384. 
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well.87 The court found that the open pit system employed on the surface 
owners’ property between 2007 and 2009 was the common method em-
ployed in the state at the time.88 An alternative disposal method known as 
the closed-loop system required the removal of drill waste from the well 
site; the waste was then placed in off-site landfills.89 Although the defend-
ant-mining corporation used the closed-loop system in Texas and Oklahoma 
in 2004 and 2005, it did not employ it in West Virginia until December 
2009.90 Thus, at the time the open pits were drilled on the surface property, 
the open pit system was the “common and ordinary method of disposal in 
West Virginia,” and it was “consistent with permitting requirements in the 
state and approved by the [West Virginia Department of Environmental Pro-
tection].”91 The surface owners argued that comparing the drill waste dis-
posal methods in Texas and Oklahoma with those in West Virginia “ought to 
inform whether [defendant’s] drill waste disposal used on the Whitemans’ 
surface was ‘reasonably necessary.’”92 The court found that such a compari-
son is “false equivalency.”93 The court went on to say that to compare drill 
waste disposal methods within all of West Virginia would not even likely 
conform to what a reasonable necessity inquiry requires because Marvin 
established that the determination is fact-intensive.94 Therefore, each case 
should be evaluated in light of the fact that what is necessary is a fluid con-
cept.95 
Buffalo Mining’s requirement that there not be a substantial burden on 
the surface is unique to West Virginia, and has been incorporated into the 
state’s common law for over thirty years.96 This constraint to not substan-
tially burden the surface owner has not been incorporated into other mining 
states’ common law trespass doctrines.97 Indeed, West Virginia courts’ rais-
ing the standard by which mineral estate owners are allowed to use the sur-
face land possessed by another demonstrates a strong commitment to pro-
                                                                                                                           
 87 Id. at 392. 
 88 Id. at 384, 392. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 393. 
 92 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id.; see Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining Co., 55 N.Y. 538, 553 (1874). 
 95 Whiteman, 729 F.3d at 393; see Marvin, 55 N.Y. at 553 (holding that determinations of 
what is necessary must be based on the facts of each case). 
 96 See Whiteman, 729 F.3d at 392 (applying the rationale earlier established in Buffalo Min-
ing). 
 97 See, e.g., Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Tex. 2013); Pa. Game 
Comm’n v. Seneca Res. Corp., 84 A.3d 1098, 1106 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014). 
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tect surface estate owners’ rights.98 It further benefits the national economy as 
it offers greater protection to the farming industry, which provides a stable 
output indefinitely into the future.99 Interestingly, no other state has added this 
heightened requirement to its respective reasonable necessity standard.100 
C. Texas’ Take on the Reasonable Necessity Doctrine 
Like West Virginia, Texas law also applies a version of the reasonable 
necessity doctrine, but unlike West Virginia, Texas also applies the accom-
modation doctrine, which differs considerably from the substantial burden 
requirement in West Virginia.101 
The accommodation doctrine was first laid out in Getty Oil Co. v. 
Jones, and requires the surface owner to establish that the mineral owner’s 
use at least substantially impairs the surface owner’s existing use and to 
show that there is no reasonable alternative means for the surface owner to 
use the land as intended.102 This standard, while still focusing on the rea-
sonableness of alternative methods to access the minerals, requires that 
there be no reasonable alternative to the desired activity of the surface own-
er.103 
Texas’s reasonable necessity doctrine, like West Virginia, places the 
burden of proof on the surface owner bringing a claim for common law 
trespass.104 Under Texas law, a mineral owner has the right to go onto the 
surface to extract minerals and an incidental right to use as much of the sur-
face as reasonably necessary to extract and produce the minerals.105 If there 
are other reasonable alternatives available for accessing the underground 
minerals that would permit the surface owner to continue to use the surface 
                                                                                                                           
 98 See Whiteman, 729 F.3d at 391–92 (applying the Buffalo Mining court’s more exacting 
test). 
 99 See Bernstein, supra note 22. 
 100 See Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 249; Seneca Res. Corp., 84 A.3d at 1106. 
 101 Compare Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721, 725–26 (W. Va. 1980) (incorpo-
rating the substantial burden requirement into West Virginia’s reasonable necessity doctrine), with 
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 102 Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 623 (Tex. 1971). 
 103 Id. (holding that alternatives available to the surface owner are to be impractical and un-
reasonable under all the circumstances). 
 104 See Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 729 F.3d 381, 392 (4th Cir. 2013) (ex-
plaining that when surface owner-plaintiffs file a complaint for trespass they carry the burden of 
making a prima facie trespass claim); Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 249 (holding that to obtain relief on 
a claim that the mineral lessee failed to accommodate the existing use, the surface owner carries 
the burden of proof). 
 105 Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248–49; Tarrant Cty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. One 
v. Haupt, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Tex. 1993); Getty Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d at 621. 
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as intended, however, the mineral owner must pursue such alternative 
methods.106 Accordingly, to obtain relief the surface owner must prove that, 
given the particular circumstances, there are “alternative, reasonable, cus-
tomary, and industry-accepted [mineral retrieval] methods available” that 
permit the surface owner to continuing the existing use.107 Further, the Su-
preme Court of Texas has held that “if the mineral owner or lessee has only 
one method for developing and producing the minerals, that method may be 
used regardless of whether it precludes or substantially impairs an existing 
use of the servient surface estate.”108 In contrast to West Virginia, Texas not 
only does not require that there be a lack of substantial burden to the sur-
face, it also allows such a burden if the only method of mineral retrieval 
available is that currently employed.109 
In Merriman, the Supreme Court of Texas clarified that the accommo-
dation doctrine does not require the surface owner to produce evidence that 
there were no reasonable alternatives for general agricultural uses, but only 
whether there were no reasonable alternatives for the surface owner to con-
duct the activity intended.110 The Court found that the surface owner had 
failed to demonstrate that he had no reasonable alternative means of main-
taining his surface use.111 Thus, as long as there were other alternative 
means for Merriman to conduct his cattle operation, those alternative meth-
ods must be pursued with no consideration of the burden that such a re-
quirement would place on the surface owner.112 Further, the Texas court 
held that in determining the surface owner’s intended use, both parties and 
their respective interests must be considered and each one’s respective 
rights must be balanced.113 
In Merriman, the surface owner argued that the defendant mineral 
owner’s well location interfered with his cattle operation.114 The court held 
that in balancing each party’s considerations, the plaintiff surface owner 
failed to establish why such corrals could not be constructed and used 
somewhere else, and thus failed to show that his intended use was preclud-
                                                                                                                           
 106 Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 249; Haupt, Inc., 854 S.W.2d at 911–12. 
 107 Merriman, 407 S.W.3d. at 248–49. 
 108 Id. at 249 (emphasis added). 
 109 See id. 
 110 See id. at 250–51 (explaining that courts need not consider whether the surface owner can 
still conduct broadly any activity that can be characterized as “agricultural” but only whether there 
is a reasonable alternative means available by which the surface owner can still continue the par-
ticular subset agricultural activity intended). 
 111 Id. at 252. 
 112 See id. 
 113 Id. at 250 (explaining that the issue is one of fairness to both parties). 
 114 Id. at 251. 
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ed.115 The court went on to state that the evidence presented by the plaintiff 
surface owner showed only that the defendant mineral owner’s well opera-
tion substantially impaired the surface owner’s use of his existing corrals.116 
Although this substantial impairment would result in an additional expense 
and reduce the surface owner’s ability to make a profit because he must 
build new corrals, this burden was not sufficient to meet the accommoda-
tion doctrine’s standard that there be no reasonable alternative method to 
maintain the existing use.117 Indeed, in reaching such conclusion, the Mer-
riman court failed to consider: first, that the surface owner used other areas 
on the same forty-acre tract of land for his home and a barn; second, that he 
installed a permanent fence for use in conjunction with the temporary cor-
rals; and finally, that he could not simply build a new operation on his other 
leased property.118 
The Merriman court did acknowledge, however, that building a per-
manent fence—which was then rendered useless as a result of the mining 
operation’s surface destruction—substantially impaired the surface owner’s 
use of his land.119 The court’s reasoning displays a greater lack of concern 
for surface damage as compared to West Virginia’s heightened standard.120 
It is likely that if the facts from Merriman—wherein the surface owner was 
substantially harmed—were instead set in West Virginia, then an injunction 
would more likely have been granted due to the surface owner’s substantial 
impairment.121 
D. Pennsylvania’s Take on the Reasonable Necessity Doctrine 
Pennsylvania, another state known for its mining operations, also ap-
plies a doctrine similar to West Virginia’s reasonable necessity doctrine.122 
Like Texas, however, Pennsylvania courts also do not prohibit substantial 
harm to the surface.123 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that as a 
general rule of law when property rights are granted, in the absence of ex-
press language to the contrary, all incidental powers are also granted to al-
                                                                                                                           
 115 See id. at 251–52. However, Merriman did not have the funds to build another fence nor 
did he own other lands besides the plot at issue to build a permanent fence. See Petitioner’s Brief 
on the Merits, supra note 8, at *5–6. 
 116 Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 252. 
 117 Id. 
 118 See id. at 247 (emphasis added); see Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 8, at *5–6. 
 119 Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 251–52. 
 120 Id. at 249; Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721, 725–26 (W. Va. 1980). 
 121 See Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 729 F.3d 381, 390, 392 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(applying rationale laid out in Buffalo Mining); Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 251–52. 
 122 See Pa. Game Comm’n v. Seneca Res. Corp., 84 A.3d 1098, 1106 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014). 
 123 See Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 249; Seneca Res. Corp., 84 A.3d at 1106. 
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low full and necessary enjoyment of what was granted.124 As such, the min-
eral estate owner has the right to use so much of the surface as is reasonably 
necessary.125 Pennsylvania courts, however, do not mention a requirement 
that there not be a substantial burden brought to the surface owner.126 To the 
contrary, as stated in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Seneca Resources 
Corporation: “The mine owner has the right to enter and take . . . posses-
sion even as against the owner of the soil, and to use the surface so far as 
may be necessary to carry on the work of mining, even to the exclusion of 
the owner of the soil.”127 Indeed, in that case, the Commonwealth Court of 
Pennsylvania cited to Chartiers Block Coal Company v. Mellon as “the 
seminal case setting forth a subsurface owner’s rights with respect to the 
surface owner’s rights” in the state of Pennsylvania.128 
In Seneca Resources Corporation, the surface owner complained that 
the subsurface oil and gas owner did not have a right to use horizontal and 
hydraulic fracturing methods to obtain the oil and gas below, because such 
methods were not in contemplation at the time the deed was drawn.129 No-
tably, Pennsylvania’s rule permitting the severance of the mineral estate for 
coal and other solid minerals applies “with equal force” to subsurface rights 
to oil and gas.130 Thus, just the same as a mineral estate owner may convey 
property rights, owners to subsurface oil and gas property can similarly 
convey such rights through horizontal severance deeds.131 And, because 
Pennsylvania common law regarding the severance of mineral estates ap-
plies “with equal force” to oil and gas, the implicit rights contained in such 
horizontal severance deeds apply the same way.132 Thus, whether the focus 
of the particular case is on subsurface rights to minerals, oil, or gas, the im-
plicit and explicit rights to subsurface estate owners is one and the same.133 
                                                                                                                           
 124 Seneca Res. Corp., 84 A.3d at 1106 (citing to Oberly v. H.C. Frick Coke Co., 104 A. 864 
(Pa. 1918)). 
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 126 Compare Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721, 725–26 (W. Va. 1980) (prohibit-
ing substantial harm), with Seneca Res. Corp., 84 A.3d at 1106 (mentioning no prohibition against 
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 131 See Seneca Res. Corp., 84 A.3d at 1105. 
 132 See Hetrick, 608 A.2d at 1077–78. 
 133 See id. 
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The Seneca Resources Corporation court denied the surface owner’s 
complaint and held that the subsurface owner’s fracking activities and re-
sultant surface destruction were permissible.134 The court held that when 
property rights are granted, all the means of attaining such property are also 
granted as incidental so long as no limitations to the contrary are expressed 
in words.135 Particularly, the Pennsylvania court made no mention of any 
limitations on the substantiality of the surface burden that an owner should 
be expected to tolerate in consideration of a subsurface owner’s rights be-
low.136 
Evidently, like Texas, Pennsylvania courts do not take into account 
what harm is brought to the surface estate when mining operations are 
granted rights to the property located beneath.137 By accounting for the bur-
den to surface owners, West Virginia shows a greater concern for surface 
estate rights than is customary in other similarly situated states.138 Moreo-
ver, the concern that West Virginia shows for the potential burden to the 
surface portrays not only a greater concern for the surface owner’s rights, 
but also for the implications that unmonitored mining operations can have 
on the environment and national economy.139 The Buffalo Mining court’s 
heightened awareness of the need to account for surface property damage 
has been incorporated into West Virginia common law for over thirty 
years.140 This commitment demonstrates a critical concern for the rights of 
                                                                                                                           
 134 Seneca Res. Corp., 84 A.3d at 1106. 
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 136 See id. 
 137 Compare Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721, 725–26 (W. Va. 1980) (requiring 
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both surface and mineral owners alike, as well as the importance of surface 
land for agricultural activities like farming and cattle herding.141 
II. WHY STATES SHOULD ADOPT WEST VIRGINIA’S MORE EXACTING 
SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN TEST 
West Virginia courts have developed a doctrine that provides a more 
balanced approach to evaluating surface and mineral rights in severance 
deeds, and thus should be incorporated into other states’ respective common 
law doctrines.142 West Virginia common law allows subsurface owners to 
cause destruction that is reasonably necessary to access the minerals be-
low.143 Such subsurface owners, however, are not permitted to cause a sub-
stantial burden to the surface.144 This second component—the substantial 
burden prohibition—demonstrates a greater concern for property rights than 
seen in other similarly situated states.145 For instance, while Texas and 
Pennsylvania employ similar doctrines to West Virginia’s reasonable neces-
sity doctrine, neither incorporate a requirement that prevents a substantial 
burden from being placed on the surface estate.146 Accordingly, West Vir-
ginia’s heightened standard may provide surface owners with a fairer 
chance—compared to other states with similar mining activities—to receive 
a remedy if surface damage reaches a point of substantial harm.147 
Texas common law does not prevent subsurface owners from causing 
destruction to the surface if such destruction is reasonably necessary to ac-
cess the minerals below.148 Further, as the Merriman court explicitly ex-
plained, such destruction is permitted even if it substantially impairs the sur-
face land.149 Accordingly, Texas courts have incorporated a doctrine that ex-
                                                                                                                           
 141 See Buffalo Mining Co., 267 S.E.2d at 725–26 (“Any use of the surface by virtue of rights 
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plicitly permits destruction that results in a substantial burden to the surface 
owner, which is significantly different from the heightened standard in West 
Virginia.150 
In Merriman, the surface estate owner Homer Merriman built a per-
manent fence for a corral on his tract of land to use in his cattle operation.151 
Despite the court’s acknowledgement that to rebuild a new cattle operation 
on another tract of land that he did not own constituted a substantial im-
pairment, the court nevertheless held that Merriman was not entitled to an 
injunction.152 If Merriman’s case had taken place in West Virginia as op-
posed to Texas, the outcome would arguably have been more favorable for 
the surface owner due to the Texas court’s explicit finding of substantial 
impairment.153 
Though the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 
Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. (applying West Virginia law) 
did not spell out what would constitute a substantial burden, it reasoned that 
damage to merely ten percent of the surface with no financial loss to the 
surface owner was not enough.154 On the other hand, Homer Merriman suf-
fered the loss of his entire forty-acre tract of land and suffered financially 
due to the cost of building the permanent fence in the first place.155 Alt-
hough Merriman leased other land for his cattle to graze, it would have been 
a significant investment of capital and time to relocate the roundup.156 Addi-
tionally, continuing his current operation on his forty acres was no longer an 
option because XTO’s construction permanently damaged the land he need-
ed to conduct his roundup business.157 Accordingly, if West Virginia’s doc-
trine applied in Texas, Merriman would have had a chance to recover be-
cause he would have met the Whiteman court’s surface and financial harm 
concerns: Merriman’s entire property was rendered useless compared to the 
mere ten percent damaged in Whiteman, and Merriman suffered financially 
by losing his entire business.158 Thus, if the facts from the Merriman case 
                                                                                                                           
 150 See id. at 249, 251–52; Buffalo Mining Co., 267 S.E.2d at 725–26. 
 151 407 S.W.3d at 247. 
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 153 Compare id. (holding that though surface owner suffered substantial surface harm, such 
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were set in West Virginia as opposed to Texas, then the substantial impair-
ment that Merriman endured may have satisfied the substantial burden test 
so that the court would grant injunctive relief.159 
Similarly, the lack of any language in Pennsylvania’s common law 
limiting the amount of permissible destruction to the surface puts surface 
owners at grave risk of destruction to their property.160 Indeed, in Pennsyl-
vania, farming is a common means of livelihood that may potentially be 
wiped out if limitations regarding the degree of destruction permitted are 
not considered.161 
A. Potential Arguments Against Adopting the Substantial  
Burden Requirement 
Some may argue that encouraging states to incorporate West Virginia’s 
heightened standard has its disadvantages.162 For instance, reasonable buy-
ers enter into these deeds knowing that severance provisions are included 
separating mineral rights below, and thus, know that the owners of the sub-
surface estates must have access to these minerals.163 Horizontal severance 
deeds result in the creation of two separate and distinct estates: an estate in 
the surface and an estate in the minerals.164 Because mineral estate owners 
must be able to access the minerals to which they have rights below, the 
surface owner’s right to use his or her land is subject to the subsurface own-
er’s access rights.165 As Section 2.15 of the Restatement Third of Property 
states: “[R]ights necessary to the enjoyment of property may include rights 
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in addition to access, particularly when the property is severed into horizon-
tal estates.”166 Thus, for the subsurface owners to enjoy a profit, they must 
be able to “extract and remove the subject of the profit.”167 Such secondary 
rights necessary to the enjoyment of profits are accordingly implied when 
these deeds are created.168 
Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining Co., the seminal 1874 case introduc-
ing the reasonable necessity doctrine, explained that when severance deeds 
are applied, any surface activity not expressly granted to the mineral owner 
is impliedly lawful so long as such actions are reasonably necessary to ac-
cess the rights below.169 Parties thus are aware of the potential surface re-
percussions because, by their nature, horizontal severance deeds inherently 
allow harm to the surface if reasonably necessary to exercise subsurface 
rights.170 This understanding has been incorporated into various state com-
mon law doctrines on horizontal severance deeds for almost 150 years.171 
It is fair to argue then that surface owners enter into horizontal sever-
ance deeds knowing separate rights implicitly belong below, allowing sub-
surface owners to conduct surface activities reasonably necessary to enjoy 
their rights.172 The court in Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, however, scruti-
nized the standard in West Virginia allowing only such surface activities 
that were “reasonably necessary . . . without any substantial burden to the 
surface owner.”173 Those activities that did result in a substantial burden 
were only permissible when an explicit provision was included in the deed 
allowing such destructive activities to occur.174 Thus, while property owners 
enter into horizontal severance deeds knowing that their land may be 
harmed to access rights below, such destruction should only be implicitly 
permitted if it does not substantially burden the surface.175 But, if such a 
substantial impairment to the surface land is required to access subsurface 
property, then an explicit provision allowing such actions must be includ-
ed.176 In this way, the substantial burden requirement strikes a fair balance 
between the rights above and below the surface.177 
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B. Adopting the More Exacting Substantial Burden Requirement 
States like Texas and Pennsylvania should adopt West Virginia’s sub-
stantial burden requirement.178 This adjustment may prevent harm to sur-
face owners and the population that relies on the maintenance of such sur-
face land usage.179 One may argue that to encourage states like Texas and 
Pennsylvania to adopt the common law doctrine established by the courts in 
West Virginia would require those states to disregard their own settled 
common law doctrines.180 Indeed, both Texas and Pennsylvania appear to 
have settled law on the reasonable necessity standard applied therein.181 If 
there is indeed settled law, then to argue that these states should adopt West 
Virginia common law in place of their own may require those states to dis-
regard the legal principal of stare decisis.182 
1. Amending Common Law Rules 
Occasionally, parties have presented arguments directly challenging an 
established common law rule, and courts will consider the limits on their 
power to overrule an established precedent.183 Often times, courts are self-
restricting when dealing with such issues, and offer great deference to 
common law precedent.184 This is particularly true when the precedent is 
from the United States Supreme Court or the highest court of the state hav-
ing jurisdiction.185 
Stare decisis channels the law, but it does not require an “unyielding 
rigidity which nothing later can change.”186 As the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania stated in Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital, “If, after thorough 
examination and deep thought a prior judicial decision seems wrong in 
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principle or manifestly out of accord with modern conditions of life, it 
should not be followed as a controlling precedent.”187 
In both Texas and Pennsylvania, the law on horizontal severance deeds 
and surface versus subsurface rights is well established.188 Thus, in line with 
the latter view described above—that stare decisis should be disregarded 
only if the common law precedent is unsound in light of modern circum-
stances—these states perhaps should stick with their respective reasonable 
necessity standards for trespass and not look to West Virginia.189 And, 
though each in comparison to West Virginia does not appear to protect sur-
face owners to the same extent, each does provide some protection to sur-
face owners, because subsurface property rights cannot be accessed by 
means that are not reasonably necessary to do so.190 
In the seminal Texas case on this standard, however, Getty Oil Co. v. 
Jones, the Supreme Court of Texas demonstrated concern for surface own-
ers in stating that the rights implied to mineral estate owners are to be exer-
cised with due regard for the rights of the surface owner.191 Notably, in Buf-
falo Mining, the West Virginia court cited to Getty Oil for support of its 
principle that mineral owners can do what is reasonably necessary as long 
as they can do so without substantially burdening the surface.192 Further, no 
court decision in either Texas or Pennsylvania has ever explicitly rejected 
the substantial burden gloss incorporated by the Buffalo Mining court into 
West Virginia common law doctrine.193 
2. Adopting a More Rigorous Standard 
In adding this substantial burden gloss, Buffalo Mining not only cited 
to the Texas case, Getty Oil, but it did not reference any West Virginia court 
decisions explicitly stating that such a substantial burden gloss should be 
incorporated.194 In doing so, the Buffalo Mining court did not disregard 
stare decisis; instead, it considered the revised doctrine to be simply a more 
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“exacting” test than “what is reasonable and necessary,” the standard it had 
previously applied in West Virginia cases.195 
The Buffalo Mining court, in citing to other states’ interpretations of 
the reasonable necessity doctrine, demonstrates that support for West Vir-
ginia’s substantial burden requirement comes from concerns that a surface 
owner be given the “greatest possible use of his property consistent there-
with.”196 Thus, although Texas courts have traditionally restricted mineral 
owners from substantially impairing the surface, that state’s highest court 
has perhaps implicitly recognized further concern regarding surface own-
ers.197 
Moreover, Buffalo Mining’s adjustment of the doctrine demonstrates 
that states can make the reasonable necessity test more “exacting” and in 
turn account for greater concern for surface owners.198 And because adding 
the substantial burden requirement can be viewed simply as a gloss making 
the reasonable necessity test more rigorous, it does not run counter to stare 
decisis to make such an adjustment to each state’s doctrine.199 Instead, it can 
be seen as simply heightening an already existing standard by adjusting to 
changing times; as subsurface activities like hydraulic fracturing and drill-
ing for oil and gas continue to prosper in the modern era, more protection 
must be given to surface owners whose land could be all but destroyed if 
protection is not granted to prevent such harm.200 Indeed, the potential harm 
that could result if surface land is substantially impaired—and perhaps even 
destroyed altogether—presents a concern for not only present agricultural 
operations but such future activities, as well.201 
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Efforts to ensure the future success of the agricultural industry is not 
one to scoff at, as recent statistics show that farming activity is currently on 
the rise.202 Further, farming provides a more stable output of productivity 
than mining operations traditionally have; the White House Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors has even stated: “[S]tatistics show that mine production 
initially peaks and then gradually falls to zero while farming produces a 
relatively stable output indefinitely.”203 
States then should not disregard stare decisis, but instead, as in Buffalo 
Mining, should make their respective reasonable necessity standards more 
exacting.204 In the modern era, farming activity is increasingly playing a 
crucial role in the national economy while subsurface activities like frack-
ing and drilling for oil and gas bring destructive impacts to surface land.205 
Since 2005, fracking alone had directly damaged more than 360,000 acres 
of land across the country.206 Fracking activities are taking place in twenty-
five states, with the most fracking occurring in Texas, Colorado, Pennsylva-
nia, and North Dakota.207 Even if this more exacting standard may result in 
some damage to drilling activities due to limits on the surface harm permit-
ted in accessing land below, it would benefit surface owners as well as the 
agricultural industry.208 
3. Potential Benefits to the Farming Industry and National Economy by 
Adopting the Substantial Burden Gloss 
When surface owners suffer substantial damage to their property, their 
rights are unfairly harmed.209 It is true that when agreeing to a severance 
deed, surface owners are aware that a separate party owns the rights below 
the surface and may implicitly conduct surface activities reasonably neces-
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sary to reach the minerals below.210 But, while this has become a common 
understanding underlying such deeds, one would likely be significantly 
more hesitant to agree to buy surface rights if the mineral owner was also 
impliedly authorized to completely destroy the surface.211 West Virginia’s 
substantial burden requirement establishes a baseline whereby implicit and 
explicit surface usage can be drawn.212 Texas and Pennsylvania common 
law do not establish such a baseline.213 West Virginia’s common law base-
line would be beneficial to provide clarity in other similarly situated states 
like Texas and Pennsylvania to determine how much destruction is too 
much, and thus, when an explicit deed provision should be included.214 
West Virginia common law would offer clarity as to how much dam-
age surface owners should reasonably expect to endure.215 Indeed, if the 
severance provision explicitly allows for substantial impairment of the sur-
face, then surface owners should not be entitled to injunctions or any reme-
dies at law because they are fully on notice that such destruction is permis-
sible.216 But, if such substantial damage occurs in the absence of any explic-
it deed provision, then surface owners should be entitled to some remedy.217 
Without such protection, as oil and gas drilling operations continue to grow, 
surface owners may hesitate to purchase and use the surface land.218 In turn, 
this hesitation to purchase surface property would harm not only surface 
owners but the national economy that relies on the agricultural industry in 
these areas to thrive.219 
By accounting for the degree of burden to the surface estate, West Vir-
ginia common law currently demonstrates a more holistic approach to re-
solving ownership rights than other similarly situated states.220 As stated by 
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the White House Council of Economic Advisors, our nation’s “[a]griculture 
put[s] food on the table of American families at affordable prices . . . [and] 
supports one out of every twelve jobs in the economy.”221 Further, the 
Council has stated that “[t]he hard work done on the farm is felt throughout 
our economy, particularly when agriculture is thriving.”222 Thus, farming is 
essential to the economy of the United States.223 It is important that courts 
consider, as the West Virginia courts do, the burden that mining and drilling 
operations can have on farming and other surface uses when deciding re-
spective rights for surface and mineral owners.224 Consequently, West Vir-
ginia’s two-part requirement strikes a proper balance that Texas and Penn-
sylvania should emulate.225 
The period from 2009 to 2013 was the strongest five-year period for 
agricultural exports in our nation’s history.226 Thus, if the substantial burden 
that mining imposes upon a surface estate is not considered, then mining 
operations would have an adverse impact not only on the surface owner, but 
on our nation’s economy as a whole.227 Rural America contributes to the 
entire nation’s economic growth, strengthening the middle class, and build-
ing our country’s ability to compete with other strong farming countries in 
the future.228  
For instance, local Pennsylvania farmers currently supply the produce 
and meat that occupy the shelves in many grocery stores in the northeastern 
United States.229 A source recently revealed that those living in the areas 
where such local ingredients come from opt to not buy these products out of 
concern that the products have been compromised by local fracking activi-
ties to a point where they could present a serious health hazard.230 Specifi-
cally, one local Pennsylvania farmer recently revealed that she and her hus-
band sold their organic farm that they had been operating for twenty years 
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because, as a result of local fracking, “[They] can’t in good conscience say 
[their] food is organic.”231 Such damage to the surface that could lead to 
such health hazards, if litigated, would likely be considered a substantial 
harm.232 Thus, if the Pennsylvania court hearing such a case applied West 
Virginia’s substantial burden standard, the drilling activity leading to such 
substantial harm would very likely constitute an unreasonable burden on the 
surface owner’s estate, and accordingly, be forbidden under state common 
law.233 
Moreover, although mining is valuable to the national economy, farm-
ing has proven to offer an arguably more economically favorable use of the 
land in terms of its longevity.234 A mine produces its highest returns typical-
ly in the first few years of operation, but production gradually drops to zero 
over time.235 By contrast, a farm “produces a relatively stable output indefi-
nitely into the future.”236 Accordingly, the potentially infinite value of farm-
ing should be weighed against the terminal value of mining that destroys 
farmland beyond repair.237 By prohibiting the creation of an irreparable bur-
den to the surface estate, even if it is reasonably necessary to access the 
minerals below, West Virginia courts have implied a heightened concern for 
each industry’s value to the economy of the United States, creating a more 
conducive environment for farming.238 
In West Virginia, although the Whiteman court did not hold that the 
surface owner experienced a sufficiently substantial burden to be entitled to 
a remedy, that court applied the two-part standard from Buffalo Mining.239 
The Whiteman court weighed the implicit rights of the mineral owner 
against the burden to the surface owner.240 Chesapeake’s mining damaged 
only ten of the one hundred and one acres the Whitemans used for farming, 
and the family was unable to demonstrate any financial harm as a result of 
                                                                                                                           
 231 Id. 
 232 See id.; see also Buffalo Mining Co., 267 S.E.2d at 725–26 (defining the substantial bur-
den standard); Rodale, supra note 229 (pointing to studies that show fracking compromises our 
food sources and in turn, presents a “significant health hazard”) (emphasis added). 
 233 See Buffalo Mining Co., 267 S.E.2d at 725–26; see also Rodale, supra note 229. 
 234 See Bernstein, supra note 22. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. 
 237 See id. 
 238 See Buffalo Mining Co., 267 S.E.2d at 725–26 (evaluating mineral estate owner’s rights in 
light of those of the surface owner); see also Bernstein, supra note 22 (“A mine produces ore for a 
relatively brief period of time, with the highest returns in the first years, gradually falling to zero 
as it is played out. A farm, on the other hand, produces a relatively stable output indefinitely into 
the future.”). See generally Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 729 F.3d 381 (4th Cir. 
2013) (applying the substantial burden test to determine whether the mineral estate owner’s use 
infringed upon the surface owner’s rights). 
 239 See Whiteman, 729 F.3d at 394; Buffalo Mining Co., 267 S.E.2d at 725–26. 
 240 See Whiteman, 729 F.3d at 392, 394. 
208 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 43:181 
Chesapeake’s construction of waste pits.241 Given the limited property dam-
age and relative lack of financial harm, the court properly found that Ches-
apeake’s mining operations did not cause a substantial burden to the 
Whitemans’ surface rights.242 
By factoring in the degree of damage to the surface land in terms of 
use and financial harm, the West Virginia court provided the surface owners 
with a fair chance at receiving a remedy.243 If the same doctrine applied in 
Merriman, then the Texas surface owner may have received a remedy as his 
surface harm would likely have met the substantial burden requirement.244 
XTO Energy’s construction of a well on Merriman’s land, though rea-
sonably necessary to access and enjoy its mineral rights, rendered Merri-
man’s property useless for his ranching operation.245 The Supreme Court of 
Texas acknowledged that forcing Merriman to relocate his corral operation 
constituted a substantial impairment, but despite this degree of harm, it held 
that Merriman was not entitled to an injunction because the activity at issue 
was “reasonably necessary” to ensure the mineral owner’s property enjoy-
ment.246 If the Texas court incorporated the more exacting test from West 
Virginia, then given the substantial nature of the cattle herder’s harm, the 
mineral owner would not have been implicitly permitted to cause such 
damage.247 Accordingly, if the West Virginia substantial burden requirement 
were incorporated into the standard that the Texas court applied, the plain-
tiff in Merriman would have had a greater likelihood of receiving a remedy 
in court.248 
In the modern era, with farming on the rise and growing concerns with 
property destruction from activities like drilling, it is reasonable and neces-
sary to argue for states to make their common law doctrines more protective 
of surface rights.249 The two-pronged test applied in West Virginia helps 
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protect the farming industry by highlighting the importance of balancing the 
rights of both mining operators and agriculturists alike.250 
CONCLUSION 
Severance deeds often lead to conflicts between property rights above 
and below the surface. West Virginia courts have demonstrated a more bal-
anced concern for both mineral and surface rights by prohibiting the impo-
sition of a substantial burden upon surface property by a subsurface owner. 
This heightened reasonable necessity doctrine is a holistic approach that is 
more beneficial not only to individual farmers themselves, but also to the 
modern farming industry in general. Given the steady and indefinite eco-
nomic value that the farming industry offers our national economy com-
pared to mining’s short-lived value, our country must consider granting 
greater protection to farmers’ property rights. Accordingly, other states such 
as Texas and Pennsylvania—that, like West Virginia, have both heavy min-
ing and farming activities—should incorporate the substantial burden re-
quirement into their respective common law doctrines. In this way, we can 
offer greater protection to our national farming industry. 
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